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ABSTRACT 
 
Contract farming is among the institutional arrangements essential for agricultural products. In most cases, 
these contracts lead to increased incomes and welfare of farmers. However, this type of business has not 
been taken seriously in Iran. This study aimed to analyze the effect of contract farming on the income and 
risk of the farmer’s income. To this end, pistachio and saffron farmers in the Yazd Province, in central Iran, 
were considered in the harvest year of 2017-2018. We divided the farmers into three homogeneous 
groups, each with different input consumption levels and production per hectare. We calibrated the cost 
functions of representative farmers in each group. These functions were employed to develop an ideal 
formal contract model and relational contract model. According to the results, formal contracts and 
relational contracts increased income and relational contracts reduced the risk to farmers when they were 
compatible with the incentive constraints of the farmer. Policymakers should provide favorable conditions 
for the development of contract farming. For instance, they can present contract farming to farmers and 
encourage agricultural enterprises to participate in contracts by facilitating access to credit and other 
investment incentives. 
 
KEYWORDS: formal contract, relational contract, optimal contract, incentive constraint, Yazd Province 
JEL Classification: Q1, D4. 
 
RESUMO 
 
A agricultura por contrato está entre os arranjos institucionais mais essenciais para os produtos agrícolas. 
Esses contratos, na maioria dos casos, levam ao aumento da renda e do bem-estar dos agricultores. No 
entanto, esse tipo de negócio não foi levado a sério no Irã. Este estudo teve como objetivo analisar o 
efeito da agricultura contratual sobre a renda e o risco da renda do agricultor. Para esse fim, os 
produtores de pistache e açafrão na província de Yazd, no centro do Irã, foram considerados na safra 
2017-2018. Os agricultores foram divididos em três grupos homogêneos, cada um com diferentes níveis 
de consumo de insumos e produtividade por hectare. Em seguida, as funções de custo dos agricultores 
representativos foram calibradas em cada grupo. Essas funções foram empregadas para desenvolver um 
modelo de contrato formal ideal e contrato relacional. De acordo com os resultados, contratos formais e 
contratos relacionais aumentaram a renda e os contratos relacionais reduziram o risco dos agricultores 
quando eles eram compatíveis com as restrições de incentivo do produtor e principal. Recomenda-se aos 
formuladores de políticas que forneçam condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento da agricultura 
contratada. Por exemplo, eles podem familiarizar os agricultores com a agricultura contratual e incentivar 
as empresas agrícolas a participar de contratos, facilitando o acesso ao crédito e outros incentivos ao 
investimento. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: contrato formal, contrato relacional, contrato ideal, restrição de incentivo, província 
de Yazd Classificação JEL: Q1, D4 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, a tendency has begun in economics, reaching its maturity nowadays. This 
tendency, which is characterized by the contract theory or the economics of contracts, interprets human 
interactions with a contractual method for analyzing efficiency, incentives, income distribution, and many 
other concepts (LAFFONT & MARTIMORT 2002). Along with other economic sectors, agricultural contracts 
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have been widely developed (ABEBE et al. 2013). Product-sharing agreements between tenants and 
landlords formed the basis of agricultural economics in ancient times. A contract between a principal and a 
landlord farmer is an initiative that has emerged in the last 100 years (BARRETT et al. 2012). The firm can 
supply agricultural inputs or the required capital and provide the farmer with technical assistance if 
necessary. In return, the farmer sells his crop to the firm. In other words, contract farming is an agreement by 
which the farmer is committed to producing a certain amount of product at a specified price and the buyer is 
committed to buying that product (BARRETT 2008). These contracts apply to various types of crops and 
political and economic systems worldwide (DINA 1997, MINTEN et al. 2009). Contact farming plays a more 
active role in agricultural production of developing countries given the recent changes in the supply and 
demand of agricultural products in said countries, such as an increased per capita income, changing 
interests, liberalization of financial markets, and new standards of farm products (FAFCHAMPS 1992, 
LYSON 2012. 
The low income of farmers is a severe challenge to agricultural products on the market. Agricultural 
production poses a significant risk to farmers. Furthermore, the unbalanced bargaining power on demand for 
farm products is in favor of major buyers and brokers in most cases, with farmers always achieve lower 
profits (WU 2006). Hence, many studies have surveyed the impact of contract farming on the income and 
risk of farmers (LITTLE & WATTS 1994, PORTER & PHILIPS-HOWARD 1997ab, SINGH 2002, REHBER 
2007). The literature shows different results on the income and welfare level of farmers after contract 
farming. Some scholars concluded that participation in contract farming increases the income of farmers 
(WARNING & KEY 2002, BARRETT et al. 2012, BELLEMARE 2012). However, the extent in which the 
participation in contract farming affects the welfare of farmers is still controversial (BARRETT et al. 2012). 
According to WARNING & KEY (2002), MIYATA et al. (2009), and WANG et al. (2011), there is no evidence 
of the lack of increased welfare of small farmers in Senegal and China, respectively. However, SINGH 
(2002), GUO et al. (2005), and KEY & RUNSTEN (1999) reported evidence of the inefficiency of contract 
farming in increasing the welfare of farmers in India, China, and Latin America, respectively. Other studies 
have even reported a decline in the farmers’ welfare. According to the literature, in cases where contract 
farming has led to an increase in the farmers' income, the parties have had an incentive to respect the 
provisions of the agreement. In other words, the agreement determines the production and price in such a 
way that farmers with different characteristics are willing to participate in the contract. There are also 
incentives for maximum efforts by farmers (LITTLE & WATTS 1994, BIJMAN et al. 2016). 
LAFFONT & MARTIMORT (2002) and DEWATRIPONT & BOLTON (2005) have evaluated contracts 
in terms of efficiency, incentives, and information. They have introduced optimal contracts and analyzed their 
effects. However, the design of contract farming for the maximum participation of farmers has received little 
emphasis (WU 2014). Thus, a closer look at contract farming may provide more details on the design of 
incentive-compatible contracts. Therefore, the proper design of contract farming and its effects on the 
farmers are essential for policymakers because the reduction in the farmers' income can lead to an increase 
in rural-to-urban migration and a decrease in the supply of food products (SWINNEN & MAERTENS 2007). 
Contract farming has received little emphasis in Iran from the academic and policymaking perspectives. 
There is also evidence of a low and unsustainable income of farmers. Hence, the inability of farmers in 
meeting their basic needs has led to an increase in rural-to-urban migration. According to the STATISTICAL 
CENTER OF IRAN (2018), the migration rate from rural to urban areas in the Yazd Province in 2017 shows 
25% growth when compared to 2007. Therefore, analysts and policymakers should look for a solution to 
increase farmers' incomes which is important from two perspectives. First, increasing farmers' income will 
prevent them from migrating to urban areas. Second, it will avoid the reduced supply of farm products, given 
that more than 34% of agricultural products are produced by rural communities in Iran (IRAN MINISTRY OF 
AGRICULTURE JIHAD 2017). 
This study aimed to design optimal incentive-compatible contracts to increase farmers’ income. More 
information on optimal contract farming can be used in agribusinesses to create arrangements and can help 
policymakers to develop an institutional environment. To this end, the essential characteristics of contract 
farming were first discussed to model optimal contracts. Subsequently, using data collected from the 
farmers, the price and production suggested by the optimal contract and their effects on farmers' income 
were analyzed. Finally, we evaluated the risk of farmers before and after their participation in contract 
farming. 
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MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
Important Characteristics of Contract Farming 
According to the literature of contract farming, most contracts contain provisions which accurately 
determine the quality of the product. However, there is no guideline on the other commitments of the parties 
to the agreement. Particularly, contract designers neglect quantity commitments such as production and 
delivery schedule, the volume purchased by the contractor (agribusiness firms), the amount produced by the 
farmer (in production contracts), and annual changes in the quantity, which may be described only in general 
(LAJILI et al. 1997, KIRSTEN & SARTORIUS 2002). This leads to ambiguity because the quantity of the 
product sold at a given time, as its quality, is vital in determining the farmer's income and the costs of an 
agricultural firm (KOVÁCS 2018). 
Even when a contract is complete with more details than other arrangements, the absence of a third 
party to review and monitor the agreement will limit its implementation. Despite the role of a third party such 
as a court, it is difficult to detect the deviation of parties from an agreement which leads to a discretionary 
latitude from parties to deal with those deviations (WU 2014). Another characteristic of contract farming is the 
repeatable nature of such contracts. For instance, over 90% of current tomato production contracts in 
California are extended by farmers to the subsequent year (WU & ROE 2007). According to game theory, 
repeated trades are useful for reducing inefficiencies in one-shot games such as the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Since relational contracts are like a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game, an ex-post discretionary latitude 
can be organized concerning repeat trading to achieve an intuitive way to explain the incompleteness of 
contracts (LEEGOMONCHAI & VUKINA 2005). 
The fact that most contract farming is incomplete relational contracts implies ex-post discretionary 
characteristics of at least one of the parties. For instance, most agreements for the purchase of agricultural 
goods are conducted verbally by handshaking or over the telephone. Therefore, there is the possibility of 
diversion of each party from the upfront agreement. In other words, the parties must learn how to manage 
the counterparty risk. The counterparty risk means that one of the parties does not fully comply with the 
agreements. This risk is real and comprehensive in agricultural businesses (MURRAY 2014). Nevertheless, 
the classic contract theory emphasizes conflicts between risk and incentives (WU & ROE 2007). In general, 
the incompleteness of contract farming, repetitive contracts, and the counterparty risk are some of the first-
order characteristics of contract farming. 
Modeling of First-Order Characteristics 
In this section, we developed a model to include some of the first-order characteristics of contract 
farming, such as their incompleteness and repetitive nature. WU (2014) was the first to use this model. 
Based on the results obtained by HALAC (2012), LEVIN (2003), and MACLEOD (2007) on contract design, a 
more flexible model was designed to consider the discretionary and repetitive nature of contracts. 
The model starts with a principal (e.g., an agricultural firm) who contracts with an agent (e.g., a 
farmer) to produce a certain amount of a crop. As discussed earlier, a contract is an agreement to be 
executed. There are a few enforcement limits in any business negotiation that may leave at least one party 
with discretionary latitude to deviate from the upfront agreement (WU 2014). 
Under a contract, each party has obligations to take actions consistent with the agreement. The 
action taken by the principal and the farmer (agent) is ii Aa ∈
 
where PAi ,= , A is the farmer (agent) and P 
is the principal (DEWATRIPONT & BOLTON 2005). 
Also, P and B are the base price and the fixed bonus determined by the contract. The payoff functions for the 
principal and agent are defined as bpqrP −−= )(pi and )(qcbpA −+=pi , respectively, where 
0>′r , 0≤′′r , 0>′c , and 0≥′′c . The principal always prefers a larger production, whereas agents prefer 
higher payments. 
We assumed that there are only three types of production technology for the product, 
},,{ highmediumlowAA =
 including low technology or production with the lowest efficiency, medium 
efficiency, and the highest efficient technology, respectively. 
An example of a perfect enforcement technology is given by 
}}{},{},{{},,{ 321 highmediumloweeeE AAAA ==
.
 Each element should be defined so that a third party will 
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be able to distinguish the production. However, a technology characterized by 
}},{},{{},{ 21 highmediumloweeE AAA ==
 
is imperfect, because a third party can determine when a low 
supply occurs without recognizing medium and high volume. Therefore, the contractible set is defined as 
},{},{ 21 mediumloweeE AAA ==
. If }},,{{}{ 1 highmediumloweE AA == , only inefficient production 
technology is identified by the court (the court can only identify the inefficient production technology) (ibid). 
The contract execution method in the previous section provides a precise way of defining an incomplete 
contract. Considering the execution as mentioned above, 
}}{},{},{{},,{ 321 highmediumloweeeE AAAA == a complete agreement can be written. A complete 
contract can be set to trade the efficient production Q=high at a price P. Alternatively, it can determine an 
incomplete set of state-contingent prices lP  , mP ,
 
 and hP , paid after observing each production without the 
principal demanding a specific level of production. In the first contract, a third party directly determines the 
prices P and production Q. In the second contract, however, a third party enforces conditional payments lP  
, m
P
, and hP . Provided that the conditional payment method is chosen to ensure the incentive compatibility of 
production, both contracts have the same result of Q = high (WU 2014). 
Optimal Contract 
As discussed earlier, when scheduling a contract, a principal (e.g., a pistachio processing company or 
a saffron packaging and exporting company) provides a list of intended production and price without any 
information on the type of farmers (agents). The agent (farmer) checks the list and selects a contractual 
option meeting the incentive compatibility and participation subjective constraints according to the revelation 
principle (LAFFONT & TIROLE 1991). The principal proposes the contract list to maximize his utility. The 
model provided by HIDEO et al. (2012) was used in this study to analyze the formal contract. According to 
this model, the principal initially proposes a business negotiation which determines the quantity xi and the 
price wi. The index i shows the type of agent that the principal suggests for the contract. 
In the model proposed by HIDEO et al. (2012) for optimal contracts, pi is the probability that the 
principal faces with each type of farmer. As a result, we maximized the expected utility of the principal as 
follows: 
 
(1) ∑ −=
i
iii wxbputil ])([max
 
 ..ts
 
(2) 5.0)( ii xxb =
   
i∀
 
(3) ruxw iii ≥−θ
   
i∀
 
(4) jijiii xwxw θθ −≥−
   
ji ≠∀
 
 
Accordingly, (3) and (4) show the participation and incentive compatibility constraints, respectively, 
and iθ is the farmer's marginal cost when iixθ is the marginal cost for producing the product unit xi by the 
farmer type i. To calibrate the cost function, we used the method presented by HOWITT (1995). According to 
HOWITT (1995), this function is calibrated precisely in line with the farmer's behavior in the base year. 
Therefore, it can simulate agricultural policies. Furthermore, ru represents the farmer reservation utility, 
which in this study is considered the farmer's net profit without contract farming.  
The right-hand side of Constraint (3) represents the net profit. This constraint guarantees the higher 
net income of the farmer after participation in the contract when compared with the non-contractual state. 
Constraint (4) is the incentive compatibility guaranteeing that none of the farmer types will imitate another 
type. In other words, the contractual list provided to any farmer is preferable to that presented to different 
types (LAFFONT & MARTIMORT 2002). This constraint was rewritten as follows: 
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Constraints (5) and (6) guarantee that the farmer in the first group does not imitate the farmer in the 
second group and the farmer in the second group does not imitate the farmer in the first group. The contract 
proposed to any farmer must be in a way that he would prefer what is proposed instead of other proposals 
and does his best to produce according to the suggested price. We considered the above constraint for 
different types. This set of constraints are incentive-compatible constraints which guarantee farmer i will 
obtain more profits after recognizing his/her type and choosing the contract },{ ii xw  in comparison with the 
case where he/she introduces his/her type incorrectly and selects the contract },{ jj xw . Thus, the farmer's 
knowledge of his type, or in other words, the use of inputs and production of a specific product becomes 
apparent to the principal. Upon contract, the farmer will deliver the product and receive his agreed 
remuneration. 
The above contract is a formal one. An essential feature of contract farming is the incompleteness 
nature of such agreements leading to discretionary latitudes for contracting parties. Therefore, the modeling 
of relational contract, as an informal contract, is described to be consistent with the party incentives. 
As discussed, contract farming is repeatable. Since contractual relations are considered a sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma game, one can organize the discretionary latitude concerning repeat trading. To this end, 
WU (2014) developed a model in which payment to the farmer would include a fixed price (P) plus a bonus 
(B) for better performance. This bonus will increase the farmer's efforts because he is trying to achieve a 
higher reward in addition to the fixed price by performing better agricultural operations. 
For this purpose, we formulated the relational contract as follows: 
 
(7) δ
])([])([max
,,
iii
BPQ
iii
BPQr
BPQr −−+−−
 
 
s.t. 
(8) piααpiδ )1(
])([])([ −+≥−−+−− fiiiiii
BPQrBPQr
 
(9) 
ifi
iii
iii uu
QcBPQcBP )1()]([)]([ ααδ −+≥
−+
+−+
 
(10) 
δ
piααpi
δ
])1([])([])([])([ −++−≥−−+−− fiiiiiiii PQr
BPQrBPQr
 
(11) 
δ
αα
δ
])1([)]([)]([)]([ ifiiiiiiiii
uu
qcP
QcBPQcBP −++−≥−++−+
 
 
The principal knows that he/she must propose the contract ),,( QBP  in each period to meet the 
farmers' incentive compatibility and participation constraints. If these constraints are satisfied, the farmer 
accepts the offer. Hence, what the principal obtains from the contract after starting cooperation with farmer i 
in each period is iii BPQr −−)( . Therefore, its present value is equal to (OSKONEZHAD 1993): 
 
(12) 
         
])([1 iii BPQrz −−
+
= δ
δ
 
 
The principal must make offers to maximize the objective function z. 
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The utility discount rate,δ  is sometimes referred to as the rate of pure time preference. A positiveδ  
implies impartiality. In other words, the farmer prefers to obtain the utility sooner. According to DASGUPTA & 
HEAL (1980), the discount rate is not measured but chosen by the researcher. However, to determine a 
specific discount rate, the long-term interest rate on government bonds or the market interest rate will be 
equal to the utility discount rate (MARGLIN 1963). 
Constraint (8) represents the principal's participation in the relational contract. In other words, the 
principal offers a relational contract when the utility or profit from this contract exceeds the utility of the formal 
contract fpi or the utility outside of the contract pi  (reservation utility). 
Constraint (9) refers to the farmer's participation in the relational contract. Farmer i obtains 
)]([ iii QcBP −+ by participating in the relational contract in each period after the beginning of the 
partnership. Therefore, the present value of the farmer's profit was regarded as follows: 
 
(13) 
      
)]([1 iii QcBP −+
+
δ
δ
 
 
Because the relational contract is similar to a sequential prisoner's dilemma game, when seeing the 
relational contract, the farmer will find what he/she gets if he/she declines the relational contract. If the farmer 
rejects the business, the he/she will obtain the value on the right-hand side of Eq. 9. 
Constraint 10 represents the principal’s incentive compatibility. The left-hand side of Constraint 10 
indicates the present value of the utility from the relational contract for him/her. If the principal pays only a 
fixed price P observing the production of qi and refuses to pay the bonus B, farmer i will leaves the relational 
contract. As a result, the right-hand side of Eq. 10 represents the utility of the principal. 
Equation 11 shows the farmer’s incentive constraint in a relational contract. The left-hand side of the 
equation expresses the present value of the farmer's utility resulting from the adherence to the relational 
contract. If the farmer reduces his level of effort to reduce costs, he will obtain )]([ qcP − , and the principal 
does not pay the bonus B after verifying this situation. Therefore, B was removed from the right-hand side. If 
the relational contract does not hold, the present value of the utility of the farmer will be 
δ
αα ])1([ uu f −+
which results from the continued cooperation through a formal contract or termination of 
the cooperation and obtaining the reservation utility. The farmer participating in a relational contract will have 
the incentive to continue working with the principal if the incentive constraint in Eq.11 is satisfied. Formal and 
relational contracts differ in the sense that a formal contract is concluded for a year, and the parties formally 
sign the contract. However, the parties to a relational contract consider long-term interests and usually 
execute an informal contract for several years. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, three types of farmers, }3,2,1{∈i , were considered based on the cluster analysis. 
Cluster analysis is one of the most commonly used classification methods aiming to identify a homogenous 
subset of respondents and classify the respondents based on information obtained on a series of variables 
(MEILĂ 2003). In this study, we identified farmers with the same input consumption. To this end, we divided 
the input consumption into three homogenous groups based on the characteristics of the farmers. Each 
group defines a type of incentive-compatible offer that the principal must propose. Table 1 shows the 
average consumption of each input in pistachio production by various groups from the eighth year onwards. 
Pistachio lacks a commercial productivity until the seventh year, obtaining productivity from the eighth 
year. Therefore, we collected data on the consumption of inputs from the eighth year onwards. The principal 
faces three groups of farmers and must offer them incentive-compatible contracts before identifying the type 
of farmers. 
Table 2 shows the average consumption of inputs for producing one hectare of saffron for three 
groups of farmers. 
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Table 1. Average consumption of inputs and productivity of pistachio per hectare in different groups of 
farmers. 
 
  Water 
 (103 m3) 
Nitrate 
fertilizer 
(bag) 
Phosphate 
fertilizer 
(bag) 
Manure 
(tons) 
Labor  
force  
(hrs) 
Land   
preparation 
(hr) 
 Pesticides  
(L) 
 Dry   
pistachio 
(kg) 
       Input 
 
 Group 
 5  8.3   15   27 29.35      11 15.9 815 First Group 
 5  8.2   14.7   26.1 27.26     10.92 15.75 785 Second   Group 
 5  7.8   14   25 25.92     10.4 15 760 Third Group 
 Source: research findings. 
 
 
Table 2. Average consumption of inputs and productivity of saffron per hectare for different groups of 
farmers. 
 
 Water 
(103 m3) 
   Nitrate 
fertilizer 
(bag) 
   Manure 
(tons) 
 Labor force 
(hrs) 
    Land 
preparation 
(hr) 
 Pesticides 
(L) 
Stigma yield       
(kg) 
           Input 
 
    Group 
3.6 2.75 16.5 82.72 17.8 5.5 2.5 First Group 
3.6 2.625 15.75 78.96 16.6 5.25 2.45 Second Group 
3.6 2.5 15 75.2 14.4 5 2.3 Third Group 
 Source: research findings. 
 
Reservation utility (ru) values for pistachio production from the eighth year onward and saffron in three 
groups of farmers were calculated for the prices of 2018 listed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Costs and incomes of pistachio farmer representatives (UD$/ha). 
 
     Group 3 farmer      Group 2 farmer      Group 1 farmer  
17739.46 18517.99 19494.12 Total costs 
19874.36 20512.53 21406.48 Sales 
2134.711 1993.112 1912.362 Reservation utility (ru) 
  Source: research findings. 
 
 
Table 4. Costs and incomes of saffron farmer representatives (UD$/ha). 
 
    Group 3 farmer     Group 2 farmer      Group 1 farmer 
 3335.94 3867.94 3918.77 Total costs 
5462.53 5937.53 5937.53 Sales 
2126.35 2069.11 2018.76 Reservation utility (ru) 
  Source: research findings. 
 
We calculated the costs of chemical and non-chemical inputs using data from the STATISTICAL 
CENTER OF IRAN (2018) website. We collected further information through a questionnaire. Thus, the total 
cost for one hectare of pistachio and saffron was determined based on prices from 2018 listed in the 
following tables. 
Saffron presents productivity numbers from the first year, and farmers do not have to wait eight years 
to harvest the crop, as occurs with pistachio. Therefore, we calculated the cost and income figures from the 
first year. 
The Effects of Formal and Relational Contracts on the Income and Production of Pistachio 
In this section, we analyzed the effect of formal and relational contracts on the income and production 
of pistachio considering three groups of farmers. To this end, we present the price and production proposed 
by optimization for each representative farm. To calculate the expected utility of the principal, we determined 
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the probability that the principal faces each type of farmer. HIDEO et al. (2012) calculated the expected utility 
by using the Monte Carlo simulation. In this case, the possibility of encountering a farmer type is completely 
random. We calculated the average price and proposed production for each group of farmers in 1000 Monte 
Carlo iterations by GAMS (2010). The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Results of an optimal contract for pistachio. 
 
                 Relational contract  
            (utility discount rate: 20%)       Formal contract  
Income surplus 
(US$) 
Suggested 
production 
quantity 
Suggested 
price 
(US$/kg) 
Income surplus 
(US$) 
Suggested 
production 
quantity 
Suggested 
price 
(US$/kg)  
19048.84 (1520 kg) 1.8 ha 39.66 11909.91 
(1392 kg) 
1.7 ha 34.67 
Representative 
Farm Group 1 
14679.79 (1050 kg) 1.33 ha 38.00 6703.37 
(910 kg) 
1.15 ha 33.48 
Representative 
Farm Group 2 
11256.02 (697 kg) 0.91 ha 36.57 3238.98 
(524 kg) 
0.68 ha 32.30 
Representative 
Farm Group 3 
Source: research findings. 
 
Accordingly, the price and production proposed in the relational contract is higher than those 
suggested by the formal contract. Relational contracts are usually more efficient given that they consider 
stronger incentives to participate in the contract for the parties to follow the agreement in a self-enforcement 
manner (WU 2006). In a relational contract, the parties obtain new information in the contractual environment 
and adapt themselves accordingly (WILLIAMSON 1985). 
In both types of contracts, farmers obtain a positive income surplus by participating in the business 
deal. Income surplus for all three types of farms is higher in the relational contract than that of the formal 
contract. As discussed earlier, a formal contract is concluded only once with the farmer. In contrast, the 
farmer and the principal conclude the relational contract for several years. We considered the present value 
of the relational contract for both parties. As a result, there is a stronger motivation for the farmer to obtain a 
higher income with more efforts in a relational contract. Due to a stronger incentive (in this case, the farmer) 
to make further efforts to achieve a higher income surplus, the contract theory is also known as the incentive 
theory (LAFFONT & TIROLE 1991)  
The present cultivation area for the farmer representing Group 1 is 1.7 ha. A large part of the area 
under cultivation belongs to Ahmad Aghaei types with a sales price of 26.12 to 33.25 US$ per kilogram. 
According to Table 5, the suggested price for pistachio production is 34.67 US$ per kilogram for formal 
contract and 39.66 US$ per kilogram for the relational contract. The production proposed by the relational 
contract is of 1520 kg equivalent, to 1.8 ha for the farmer representing Group 1. The farmer representing 
Group 1 should increase the cultivation area by 0.1 ha to produce 1520 kg pistachios per hectare. However, 
given that the short-term increase in the pistachio cultivation area is impossible, the farmer increases the 
productivity per hectare to deliver more product to the principal and earn a total income surplus of 19048.84 
US$. 
The cultivation area for the farmer representing Group 2 is of 1.5 ha. Given the productivity of 910 kg 
per ha and a suggested price of 33.48 US$ per kg in the formal contract, the farmer earns an income surplus 
of 6703.37 US$. To this end, he must allocate 1.15 ha of his current pistachio land to the contracted 
production. The remaining 0.35 ha is not contracted, and the farmer can sell it on the cash market. However, 
the cultivation area increases in the relational contact and reaches 1.33 ha. Considering the suggested price 
of 38 US$, the farmer earns an income surplus of 14679.79 US$ by producing 1050 kg, which is more than 
twice the income surplus in the formal contract. 
The cultivation area for the farmer representing Group 3 is of 1.4 ha. The production proposed by the 
formal contract is 524 kg, with a price of 32.30 US$ per kg, which covers a cultivated area of 0.86 ha leading 
to an income surplus of 3238.98 US$. However, the production proposed by the relational contract is 697 kg 
with a unit price of 36.57 US$, leading to an income surplus of 11256.02 US$, which is more than three 
times the income surplus in the formal contract. The farmer participating in a relational contract cultivates 
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only 0.91 ha under the contract and can sell pistachios produced from the remaining 0.5 ha in the cash 
market at a lower price than that in the contract. 
It is noteworthy that the contract does not cover some pistachio lands of the farmers representing 
Groups 2 and 3, which is predictable, since, according to LAFFONT & MARTIMORT (2002), an optimal 
contract offers a lower production at a lower price for low-efficiency agents than highly efficiency agents to 
make an incentivize more efforts. Laffont considered efficiency as the marginal cost of the agent and 
believes that an agent with a lower marginal cost will be more efficient. Therefore, according to the PMP-
calibrated cost function for farmers representing groups 1 to 3, one can conclude that the farmer 
representing group 1 is more efficient than those in groups 2 and 3, and the farmer representing group 2 is 
more efficient than that in group 3 because of a lower marginal cost. Therefore, the principal offers him/her a 
higher production and price. 
The Effects of Formal and Relational Contracts on Income and Production of Saffron 
This section concerns the effect of formal and optimal contracts on the income and production of 
saffron in three groups of farmers. As occurs with Pistachios, we calculated the results for the optimal 
contract using GAMS (2010). The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
  Table 6. Results of an optimal contract for saffron. 
 
      Relational contract  
 (utility discount rate: 20%)          Formal contract   
Income  
surplus (US$) 
Suggested 
production 
quantity 
Suggested 
price 
 (US$/kg) 
Income  
surplus (US$) 
Suggested 
production 
quantity 
Suggested 
price 
(US$/kg) 
  
15666.31 (9.99 kg) 3.99 ha 3134.54 3507.18 
(4.05 kg) 
1.62 ha 2432.25 
Representative 
Farm Group 1 
13322.17 (8.87 kg) 3.54 ha 3049.04 2507.54 
(2.85 kg) 
1.14 ha 2427.02 
Representative 
Farm Group 2 
10891.11 (7.17 kg) 3.12 ha 2967.81 1554.92 
(1.6 kg) 
0.69 ha 2421.80 
Representative 
Farm Group 3 
  Source: research findings. 
 
Accordingly, the price and production suggested by the relational contract are higher than those 
provided by a formal contract because of stronger incentives for participation in relational contracts. As a 
result, more effort is made by the farmer to earn a higher income surplus. For instance, the net income of the 
saffron farm for the representative of group 1 with a cultivation area of 1.2 ha and a price of 2375 US$ per 
kilogram is of 2493 US$ before the contract. Given the fact that the price suggested by the formal contract is 
9% higher than the saffron market price, cultivation area increases from 1.2 ha to 1.62 ha leading to a net 
income of about 6626 US$ after participation in the formal contract. If the farmer participates in a relational 
contract, the suggested price and production will be of 3507.184 US$ per kg and 9.99 kg, respectively, which 
results in an income surplus of 15666.31 US$ for the farmer representing group 1. The income surplus is 7.5 
times the production in the absence of a contract and 2.7 times the production under the formal contract. 
Given the positive yield of saffron in the harvest year, the income surplus will motivate the farmer to earn a 
higher income by participating in a relational contract and increasing cultivation area. To achieve this income 
surplus through a relational contract, the farmer should increase the cultivating area to 3.99 ha. 
The cultivation area of the farmer representing Group 2 is of 1 ha. The price and production suggested 
by the formal contract are of 2427.02 US$ per kg and 2.85 kg, respectively. The price and production 
proposed by the relational contract are of 3049.04 US$ and 8.87 kg, respectively. These values are 
equivalent to a cultivation area of 3.54 ha. In the case of a formal contract, the income surplus is of 2507.54 
US$, which is 2.42 times that obtained without participating in a formal contract. If the farmer representing 
Group 2 accepts a relational contract, he earns an income surplus of 13322.17 US$ which is 4.7 times that 
obtained without participating in a relational contract. It is noteworthy that the farmer should increase the 
cultivating area from 1 ha to 1.14 ha in the formal contract and to 3.49 ha in the relational contract to achieve 
this income surplus. Saffron is profitable in the first year of cultivation, so the farmer can increase the 
cultivation area to increase the income surplus. 
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The cultivation area for the farmer representing Group 3 is of 0.8 ha. The income surplus for the formal 
and relational contracts equals 1554.92 and 10891.11 US$, which are respectively 2 and 6.4 times higher 
than the income surplus in the absence of formal and relational contracts. Note that the production 
suggested by the formal contract for the farmer representing Group 3 is lower than that in the absence of a 
formal contract. However, the income surplus is higher in this case because of a higher price suggested by 
the formal contract. The production suggested by the relational contract is 7.17 kg, equivalent to 3.12 ha. 
Therefore, the farmer representing Group 3 must make efforts to increase the cultivation area to achieve 
income surplus. 
The analysis provided by LAFFONT & MARTIMORT (2002) applies to the marginal cost of saffron 
producers. The farmer with a lower marginal cost works more efficiently. Therefore, the production and price 
suggested for the farmer representing Group 1 are higher than those in Group 2 and 3. The corresponding 
values for the farmer representing Group 2 are higher than that in Group 3. 
The Risk of Farmers before and after the Contract 
Mean-variance is one of the methods for considering the risks of agricultural activities. Based on the 
expected revenue -variance method, farmers are risk-averse, and the farmer's risk is estimated through 
revenue variance (ANDERSON et al. 1977). Triangular distribution can be used to determine the subjective 
mean and variance of farmers. The triangular distribution is a continuous distribution and requires three risk 
variables (e.g., yield or price of crops) including the minimum (a), maximum (b), and the most probable (m) 
value of the risk variable (ANDERSON et al. 1977). We calculated the mean E(x) and variance V(x) for the 
triangular distribution using Eqs. 14 and 15, respectively: 
(14) 3)()( mbaxE ++=
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We used the time series data and various pistachio and saffron production values, shown in Table 7, 
to calculate the subjective mean and variance of gross margin of pistachio and saffron producers. 
 
Table 7. Price and annual production of one hectare of pistachio and saffron. 
 
Saffron gross 
margin 
(US$/ha) 
Pistachio 
gross margin 
(US$/ha) 
Saffron 
price 
(US$/kg) 
Pistachio 
price 
(US$/kg) 
Saffron 
yield 
(kg/ha) 
Pistachio 
yield (kg/ha) Crop year 
2385.42   4958 1355.35  5.44 1.76 911.2 2008 
3573.64 6858.55 1353.65  6.86 2.64 988.4 2009 
6742.33 5254.17 1793.17  7.30 3.76 719.2 2010 
7366.86 4769.02 1959.27  7.47 3.76 637.6 2011 
6597.07 19145.19 1754.54 24.46 3.76 782.4 2012 
12127.53 14696.74 3295.52 12.90 3.68 1138.4 2013 
12083.62 15146.29 3364.03 12.74 3.59 1188.8 2014 
10854.53 13632.3 3049.02 11.53 3.56 1181.6 2015 
12244.05 13208.08 3000.99 11.02 4.08 1198.4 2016 
9311.99 9902.78 2839.02 13.79 3.28 717.6 2017 
4656.14 3040.01 2910.08 38.00 1.6     80 2018 
   Source: Ministry of Agriculture Jihad website. 
  
Table 8 shows the subjective mean and standard deviation of farmers on the gross margin of pistachio 
and saffron. 
To compare the risk associated with the gross margin after the contract, we calculated the mean and 
standard deviations of the gross margins for pistachio and saffron suggested by the relational contract for 
different discount rates. Table 9 shows the results. 
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Table 8. Subjective mean and variance of farmers determined using the triangular distribution method. 
 
Product Gross margin 
 
a (US$/ha) b (US$/ha) m (US$/ha) Mean     (US$/ha) 
    Standard  
deviation 
Pistachio 3040.019 19145.19 10055.56 10746.92 255833753 
Saffron 2385.426 12244.05 7994.838 7541.439 95868348 
    Source: research findings. 
 
 
Table 9. Mean and variance of the gross margin of the relational contract for pistachio and saffron. 
 
    Mean (US$/ha)   Standard Deviation  Product 
13152.12 15847263 Farm representing Group 1 
Pistachio 12226.23 12589743 Farm representing Group 2 
11856.21 5847963 Farm representing Group 3 
7952.42 702158 Farm representing Group 1 
Saffron 7812.97 689524 Farm representing Group 2 
7743.21 602548 Farm representing Group 3 
Source: research findings. 
 
According to the results presented in Tables 8 and 9, the standard deviation of the gross margin of the 
relational contract is lower than non-contract production. The mean production expected under a relational 
contract is higher than that under no contract. According to the results, the farmer participating in the contract 
experiences less volatility in gross margin and earn more revenues. These results are consistent with other 
studies on contract farming. The farmer participating in contract farming are incentivized to make more effort 
for a larger production and income surplus. At the same time, price fluctuations are lower if the price is 
specified. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Contract farming is rapidly spreading in developing countries partly due to the need of domestic and 
foreign stores for more modernized supply chains, as well as the growth of quality assurance standards 
(HENSON et al. 2005, SWINNEN & MAERTENS 2007). Recent studies on contract farming have focused on 
farmers' participation, contractual relationships, and measurement of the welfare effects of contracts. This 
study evaluated the impact of formal and relational contracts on the income and risk of pistachio and saffron 
producers in the Yazd Province in central Iran. Because contract farming has received little emphasis in Iran, 
the cost function of the farmers was calibrated by using positive mathematical programming (PMP) after 
determining three groups of farmers with different input consumption and yield per hectare. 
Subsequently, we reviewed the formal and relational contracts and presented the results on 
optimization of both contracts. We modeled both types of contracts according to incentive constraints on the 
participation of the farmer and principal. According to the results, the production and price suggested by the 
relational contract were higher than those suggested by the formal contract. According to WU (2014), 
stronger incentive constraints of relational contracts, which both parties repeatedly sign over several years, 
increase the parties' efforts to respect the terms of the contract. Therefore, the farmer's efforts to achieve a 
higher income surpluse lead to a higher production and, consequently, a higher price, which in turn 
maximizes the present value of the farmer's utility. We calculated the farmer's income and variance 
according to the time series of pistachio and saffron and compared them with the mean and variance derived 
from the relational contract. We found that the farmer who participated in the relational contract experienced 
less volatility and risks while earning more revenues. This study also presented two policymaking proposals. 
First, to support the farmers, the policymaker must consider the development of contract farming. The 
farmers should be acquainted with these contracts through the agricultural promotion agencies to increase 
their participation in contract farming. Second, the government should encourage agribusiness companies to 
participate in contract farming. For instance, by creating proper structures, facilitating access to credits, and 
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providing other incentives to investment, the government should pave the way for agribusiness companies to 
enter such contracts. The juridical and legal principles of the contracts should also be considered by 
policymakers under the national conditions. Finally, we suggests further studies. First, given the fact that Iran 
is suffering from a drought crisis, researchers should explore the use of contracts to develop low-water crop 
production in different parts of Iran. Second, other types of cost functions are recommended for modeling the 
optimal contract. Since, in most cases, it is difficult to distinguish farmer types in terms of input consumption 
and yield, the type of farmer can be continuously considered to design an optimal contract for the farmers. 
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